The Government’s Anti-Muslim Hostility Definition: A Detailed Assessment

Examining the Definition and Its Broader Policy Context

Majid Iqbal, CEO, Islamophobia Response Unit

Some commentators have raised concerns that a non-statutory definition of anti-Muslim hostility could restrict free speech or function as a “blasphemy law.” As a lawyer with 20 years’ experience, I can clarify that non-statutory definitions have no legal force and cannot create criminal offences or restrict lawful expression. Blasphemy laws impose criminal punishment; a definition that guides public bodies on recognizing discrimination operates entirely differently. With this clarified, we can examine the substance of what has been proposed.

The definition must be understood within the broader context of the government’s social cohesion strategy and related policy developments affecting Muslim communities.

THE CONSULTATION PROCESS

The government convened a working group and conducted a call for evidence to inform the definition. The call for evidence, which ran from 16 June to 20 July 2025, imposed character restrictions on responses: 600 characters for one question and 1,000 characters for two others. To provide context, this paragraph exceeds those limits. Given the complexity of questions about systemic discrimination, institutional responses, and the experiences of 3.9 million British Muslims, these constraints may have limited the depth and nuance of stakeholder submissions.

The working group delivered its recommendations following their six-month mandate. We understand that the final definition departs significantly from what the working group proposed. The government has now released its definition at a time when Home Office data shows anti-Muslim hate crimes have risen by 19-20% to 4,478 offences in the year ending March 2025, representing 45% of all religious hate crimes in England and Wales; thereby making Muslims the most frequently targeted religious group. Home Office data also documented a significant spike in incidents following the Southport riots.

The definition’s release during Ramadan, approaching the time of Eid celebrations (approximately 20 March), has been noted with concern by many in the Muslim community, who view the timing as unfortunate given the significance of this period.

ANALYSIS OF THE DEFINITION

The definition consists of three principal elements:

1. Criminal acts: Intentionally engaging in, assisting or encouraging criminal acts (violence, vandalism, harassment, intimidation) directed at Muslims or those perceived to be Muslim
2. Prejudicial stereotyping: Treating Muslims as a collective group with fixed negative characteristics, with the intention of encouraging hatred
3. Unlawful discrimination: Engaging in unlawful discrimination where the conduct is intended to disadvantage Muslims in public and economic life

The definition is accompanied by extensive guidance emphasising protections for free speech, including explicit protection for “ridiculing or insulting” Islam.

Elements We Welcome

The definition includes important recognition that anti-Muslim hostility can be directed at “those who are perceived to be Muslim, including where that perception is based on assumptions about ethnicity, race or appearance.” This acknowledges the racialised dimension of anti-Muslim discrimination and Islamophobia[1] — a concept we advocated for strongly.

Significantly, Section 5 of the guidance includes a paragraph that is intended to describe racialisation, even though it does not use that term. The guidance states:

“In practice, hostility against Muslims often relies on assumptions about dress, appearance, names, or other perceived markers that the perpetrator associates with being Muslim. These assumptions treat individuals as if they belong to a collective group with fixed negative traits – a process sometimes described as racialisation.”

This is valuable. The guidance explicitly describes the mechanism of racialisation: how assumptions based on perceived markers lead to people being treated as a collective group with fixed negative characteristics. This helps explain why Sikh men are sometimes targeted, why discrimination disproportionately affects South Asian and brown Muslims, why appearance-based assumptions drive much Islamophobia, and why discourse on issues like grooming gangs focuses on specific ethnic groups despite National Police Chiefs’ Council data showing 85% of group-based child sexual abusers are white.

However, this represents a missed opportunity. By describing the concept of racialisation without using the established analytical term, the government may limit public understanding. The phrase “a process sometimes described as racialisation” appears almost as an afterthought, acknowledging the term exists without fully embracing it.

The term “racialisation” has analytical power. It is understood by academics, practitioners, and advocates working on discrimination. Using it clearly and prominently would have provided a sharper analytical framework for understanding how anti-Muslim hostility operates. By relegating it to a parenthetical reference while describing the concept in other words, the guidance may confuse readers and limit the definition’s utility as an educational tool.

Nevertheless, we acknowledge that the substance is present. The guidance does describe how racialisation works, which is beneficial even if the terminology could have been clearer and more prominent.

The definition also acknowledges that discrimination can involve “the creation or use of practices and biases within institutions,” recognising that anti-Muslim hostility operates at institutional as well as individual levels. However, our view is that this does not go far enough and once again that it does clearly spell out that includes systemic and institutional Islamophobia.

Critical Concerns: The Intent Requirement

Our most significant concern relates to the repeated requirement of intent throughout the definition. The words “intentionally” or “intention” appear three times:

• Criminal acts must be “intentionally” engaged in
• Stereotyping must be done “with the intention of encouraging hatred”
• Unlawful discrimination must be “intended to disadvantage Muslims”

This creates an extremely high threshold that may render the definition ineffective for addressing the vast majority of anti-Muslim discrimination cases.

From our casework experience at the IRU, most discrimination does not involve provable malicious intent. Consider these real-world scenarios from our caseload:

• A recruitment algorithm that disproportionately filters out applicants with visibly Muslim names. This typically reflects unconscious bias in the data it was trained on, not intentional discrimination by the employer.
• A workplace culture where Muslim employees routinely face microaggressions: colleagues making “jokes” linking beards to terrorism, repeated mispronunciation of Muslim names despite correction, expressions of surprise when Muslim staff demonstrate competence. The individuals involved rarely intend to discriminate, they may view their behavior as harmless banter.
• Institutional policies that have disproportionate effects on Muslims, such as blanket bans on religious headwear that were not specifically designed to target Muslims but have that practical effect.

In discrimination law, most successful claims establish discriminatory effect without needing to prove discriminatory intent. The Equality Act 2010 recognizes both direct discrimination (which may involve intent) and indirect discrimination (which focuses on disproportionate impact regardless of intent). By requiring intent for discrimination to constitute “anti-Muslim hostility,” the definition excludes the majority of discrimination cases. This means that less weight can be attached to cases involving “anti-Muslim hostility” or that such cases will not be able to rely upon any elements of this definition whatsoever.

This is particularly problematic for the third element, which states that unlawful discrimination only counts where it is “intended to disadvantage Muslims.” In our experience, even when discrimination is proven unlawful, establishing that it was intentional is often impossible. Discrimination typically arises from unconscious bias, institutional inertia, or indifference, not from deliberate intent to disadvantage.

The practical effect of this requirement is that the definition may have limited utility for addressing discrimination in employment, education, and public services, i.e. where Muslims experience systematic disadvantage. Further, it may also have limited use by those in power. They may choose not to rely upon the definition for fear of being unable to prove the intention element.

Terminology: “Anti-Muslim Hostility”

The government has confirmed its choice of “anti-Muslim hostility” rather than “Islamophobia.” While we acknowledge this reflects consideration of various stakeholder perspectives, we maintain our concern that “hostility” inadequately captures the full spectrum of anti-Muslim discrimination and that failing to utilise the term Islamophobia is a significant missed opportunity.

“Hostility” connotes active animosity or aggression. As discussed above, much discrimination affecting Muslims arises from systemic barriers, unconscious bias, or institutional indifference rather than overt hostility. The term may create a perception that only aggressive, antagonistic behavior constitutes anti-Muslim discrimination, potentially minimising more subtle but pervasive forms.

The internationally recognised term “Islamophobia”, like homophobia or transphobia—better captures the systemic, often unconscious nature of this form of prejudice. The government’s rejection of this terminology may signal a narrowing of what forms of discrimination are recognized as worthy of attention.

Free Speech Protections

The accompanying guidance provides extensive and detailed protections for free expression, explicitly stating that protected speech includes:

• Criticisms of Islam or its practices
• “Ridiculing or insulting” Islam or portraying it in ways Muslims might find disrespectful
• Criticism of individual Muslims’ belief systems or practices

While we absolutely recognise the fundamental importance of free expression in a democratic society, we note the emphasis, length, and specificity of these protections. They occupy substantial space in the guidance, suggesting they were a primary concern in drafting.

There is a concern that this detailed emphasis on what is protected may create an imbalance. The definition itself has limited scope (due to the intent requirements discussed above) to address discrimination Muslims actually experience. Meanwhile, the extensive free speech protections may embolden hostile rhetoric, with speakers confident they can ridicule or insult Islam and Muslims while remaining within the definition’s safe harbor.

Context matters: Muslims in the UK face rising hate crimes (up 19-20% to 4,478 offences, 45% of all religious hate crimes), systematic discrimination in employment and education, and hostile political and media discourse. In this environment, a definition that narrowly defines what constitutes anti-Muslim hostility while broadly protecting hostile speech may not achieve its stated purpose of protecting Muslims.

What the Definition Lacks

Based on our casework experience, an effective definition would:

• Recognise discrimination based on effect, not just intent
• Clearly encompass institutional and systemic discrimination
• Address unconscious bias and microaggressions
• Provide clear guidance for employers and institutions on identifying and preventing discrimination
• Balance free expression with recognition that hostile rhetoric contributes to discriminatory environments

The current definition’s focus on intentional acts, criminal behavior, and incitement to hatred may make it useful for prosecuting the most extreme cases of anti-Muslim hostility. However, it provides limited guidance for addressing the day-to-day discrimination Muslims experience in workplaces, schools, universities, and public services—discrimination that is no less harmful for being unintentional.

BROADER POLICY CONTEXT: THE SOCIAL COHESION STRATEGY

The definition is being released alongside the government’s social cohesion strategy, which includes several policy mechanisms that warrant careful examination regarding their impact on Muslim communities.

The strategy includes four mechanisms that require monitoring to ensure proportionate and non-discriminatory implementation:

Annual Extremism Reporting

The strategy proposes annual reporting on extremism categorising threats by ideology, including “Islamism,” “Extreme Right,” and “Extreme Left.” This framework raises questions about the treatment of Muslim political engagement compared to political activism rooted in other religious traditions.

Unlike Christian political thought or Jewish political engagement (which are not categorised as distinct security concerns) this approach creates a specific category for political activism informed by Islamic principles. There is a concern that this framework may conflate legitimate political engagement by Muslims with security threats, potentially creating a perception that politically engaged Muslims constitute a suspect category.

The IRU will monitor how this reporting framework is implemented to assess whether it disproportionately affects Muslim communities or conflates lawful religious and political expression with extremism.

University Cohesion Charters

The strategy includes encouraging universities to adopt “Cohesion Charters” co-designed with students to guide conduct on campus. While framed as neutral, the timing of this proposal (following significant campus activism regarding Palestine) raises questions about its intended application.

Our concern is that such charters may be used to discipline Muslim students not for unlawful conduct (which would be addressed through existing legal frameworks and policing) but for expression that is characterised as threatening “community cohesion.” Based on our casework experience, we have seen how vague allegations of creating “division” can be deployed to suppress legitimate advocacy by Muslim students.

A key question is whether the application of such charters will be even-handed. Will students expressing vocal support for Israeli military actions face equivalent scrutiny for potentially divisive speech, or will concerns about cohesion be applied selectively?

These charters will reportedly be enforced through enhanced Prevent duty monitoring and Office for Students oversight, which warrants attention to ensure they do not chill legitimate student expression.

Enhanced Charity Commission Powers

The strategy includes enhanced Charity Commission powers to address “extremist abuse of charities,” including authority to suspend trustees and implement automatic disqualification for individuals with hate crime convictions.

While addressing genuine extremist abuse of the charitable sector is a legitimate aim, Muslim charities have historically faced disproportionate scrutiny. Charities providing humanitarian relief to Gaza, hosting speakers critical of Western foreign policy, or engaging in advocacy on issues affecting Muslims have faced regulatory investigations based on complaints from hostile actors.

These enhanced powers provide expedited mechanisms for regulatory action. The IRU will monitor their application to assess whether they are deployed proportionately or whether they disproportionately affect Muslim civil society organizations.

Home Office Horizon-Scanning

The strategy proposes a Home Office “horizon-scanning function” to monitor activities in hireable venues, outdoor spaces, charity organizations, student unions, and non-affiliated student groups.

In practice, this could encompass monitoring of a wide range of ordinary Muslim community activities: talks in hired halls, university Islamic society lectures, charity fundraising events, and even outdoor religious celebrations.

While the government’s stated aim is to identify genuine extremist activity, there is a risk that this function could constitute surveillance of lawful religious and community life. Genuine security threats are already monitored by security services operating under appropriate legal frameworks and oversight. The concern is that this horizon-scanning function may extend beyond legitimate security objectives to monitor ordinary community activities that pose no threat.

The IRU will be examining the scope, legal basis, and oversight mechanisms for this function to ensure it does not amount to discriminatory surveillance of Muslim communities.

THE PROPOSED SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE

The strategy also proposes the creation of a “special representative on anti-Muslim hostility”; effectively a dedicated role to address discrimination against Muslims. This proposal has both potential benefits and risks.

If implemented well, with a genuinely independent representative accountable to the Muslim community and empowered to speak candidly about institutional failures, this role could provide valuable advocacy for Muslims in policy spaces where community voices are currently underrepresented.

However, there are legitimate concerns about how this role might be structured. If the representative is selected by government without meaningful community input, or if the role is designed to validate government positions rather than challenge discrimination, it could prove counterproductive. A government-appointed figure lacking community accountability could undermine rather than advance Muslim interests.

The IRU’s position is that any such representative should be approved by and accountable to the Muslim community, not selected solely by government. The appointment process, reporting structures, and independence of the role will be critical factors in determining whether it serves Muslim communities effectively or becomes a mechanism for managing rather than addressing their concerns.

COMPARATIVE POLICY RESPONSES

It is worth examining how government policy responds to different forms of abuse and discrimination, as this provides context for assessing the framework being applied to anti-Muslim hostility.

Recent revelations regarding historical abuse networks allegedly involving prominent individuals, (including British political figures, royalty, and establishment elites) have received limited sustained policy attention. Despite the serious nature of allegations contained in documents known as the Epstein Files, there has been no dedicated task force, no annual reporting framework, and no enhanced monitoring mechanisms comparable to those being proposed for extremism.

By contrast, issues of child sexual exploitation involving perpetrators from specific ethnic backgrounds have generated sustained political and media attention, leading to inquiries and policy responses. This differential treatment raises questions about what factors drive policy prioritization.

There are also observable differences in how protective security is administered for different religious communities. Jewish community sites benefit from a streamlined protective security grant administered by a prominent Jewish organisation, with relatively accessible application processes. However, Muslim mosques access protection through a separate Home Office-administered scheme with more complex bureaucratic requirements and evidentiary burdens.

This disparity exists despite Home Office data showing that Muslims experience 45% of all religious hate crimes in England and Wales, thereby making them the most frequently targeted religious group. Questions of why protective security arrangements differ between communities warrant examination.

These comparative observations are relevant to assessing whether the government’s approach to anti-Muslim hostility reflects consistent principles in addressing discrimination and protecting communities from harm.

ASSESSMENT AND CONCERNS

The Islamophobia Response Unit has concerns about both the definition itself and the broader policy context in which it is being released.

The definition’s limitations, particularly regarding terminology and the removal of racialisation, reduce its effectiveness as a tool for addressing the full spectrum of anti-Muslim discrimination. The consultation process, while formally undertaken, had constraints that may have limited stakeholder input.

The concurrent release of a social cohesion strategy containing surveillance and monitoring mechanisms that could disproportionately affect Muslim communities compounds these concerns. There appears to be an imbalance: a definition with limited scope for addressing discrimination, alongside enhanced mechanisms for monitoring Muslim community activities.

We recognise the government faces complex challenges in addressing extremism and promoting cohesion. However, the framework as currently proposed raises questions about whether the balance is appropriate, and whether Muslim communities are receiving protection commensurate with the discrimination they experience, or primarily enhanced scrutiny.

NEXT STEPS AND IRU POSITION

The Islamophobia Response Unit will reserve comprehensive judgment on the definition pending the government’s supplementary actions. These include:

• Recommendations for public sector institutions to adopt the definition
• Communications strategies to promote understanding of anti-Muslim discrimination
• Educational materials and training for public bodies
• Implementation guidance and potentially a more detailed supporting document

These supplementary measures will be significant in determining whether the definition translates into meaningful protection for British Muslims experiencing discrimination.

Our assessment will ultimately be outcomes-based: does this framework lead to tangible improvements in how anti-Muslim discrimination is recognized, prevented, and addressed in employment, education, and public life?

The IRU remains committed to supporting victims of anti-Muslim discrimination through our casework services. We will also continue to monitor the implementation of both the definition and the broader cohesion strategy, raising concerns where policies disproportionately affect Muslim communities or fail to provide adequate protection from hatred and prejudice.

We hope that the government will demonstrate, through concrete actions and proportionate implementation, a genuine commitment to protecting British Muslims from discrimination while respecting the rights and freedoms of Muslim communities to participate fully in civic life.

[1] Where the term Islamophobia is used, this refers to the APPG definition of Islamophobia.